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Introduction 
 
During the twentieth century, a series of rapid changes transformed the office of 
the presidency, affecting not only its raw power and influence upon other political 
institutions but also, crucially for an office defined as much by image as by constitutional 
authority, its status in the eyes of the American public and news media. From the turn-of-
the-century administration of Theodore Roosevelt to the Lyndon Johnson presidency in 
the 1960s, George Reedy notes, “commitment to the presidential concept” by politicians, 
voters and the news media became so pronounced that Americans were "virtually 
incapable of thinking of the United States in other terms."
1
 Progressives frequently 
encouraged the trend toward greater presidential influence as a useful means of bypassing 
entrenched conservatism in national and state legislatures but many on the political right 
were disturbed by the expansion of executive power, viewing it as both cause and 
consequence of liberal interventionism and as a threat to the equilibrium of constitutional 
government.  
The experiences of Vietnam and Watergate created a broad, albeit temporary, 
consensus across the ideological spectrum that presidential power should be restrained. 
Achieving this goal, however, proved problematic. In the unstable political and economic 
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environment of the late 1970s, the damaged institution inherited by Gerald Ford and 
Jimmy Carter struggled to function effectively. Weak party organisations, 
decentralisation of power in Congress, a newly-aggressive and cynical media, disengaged 
voters and interest group hyperpluralism combined to generate widespread perceptions 
that the political system was failing to deal with the nation's problems. Calls for a 
renewed sense of national purpose, starting with more inspirational and effective 
leadership from the White House, showed that the 'president-centric' approach to national 
politics was alive and well in the late 1970s, but no identifiable consensus existed as to 
the nature or extent of the changes required to improve the quality of executive 
leadership. Whatever their impact, intended or otherwise, upon executive authority, 
legislated reforms in the last quarter of the century, such as the 1974 Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act or 1996 Line-Item Veto Act were invariably limited in their 
impact by the narrowness of their scope. Reformers on both sides of the ideological 
divide believed more fundamental change was needed to enhance the authority of the 
presidency and restore its capacity to provide clear and creative leadership.  
A perennial favourite among the proposals for executive branch reform is the 
proposal for a constitutional amendment replacing the current arrangement of two elected 
four-year terms for the president with a single, non-renewable, six-year term. To its 
supporters, this offers the opportunity to recalibrate some of the dynamics of executive 
power, bringing the office closer in concept to the original designs of the nation's 
founders while repairing the damage done to public esteem for the office by some of its 
recent occupants. Additionally, ending the president's preoccupation with reelection and 
diluting the impact of partisanship on decision-making would, it is claimed, remove two 
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of the major systemic obstructions to bold and imaginative leadership. To critics of the 
reform, such notions are not only unworkable but blatantly anti-democratic. A single, 
non-renewable term, they argue, would isolate the presidency by de-coupling it from the 
traditional sources of political legitimation upon which it relies for its authority. It would 
reduce the president's ability to engage on equal terms with other political institutions and 
actors and destabilise the traditional checks and balances of the constitutional system by 
removing the presidential re-election cycle while leaving the congressional cycle intact. 
Finally, it is suggested, the reform idea is underpinned by a focus on presidential 
authority and independent initiative which moves the nation further away from, not closer 
to, the ideals of the Founders. 
 
Background 
The single-term proposal, described by Theodore Lowi as "the panacea that will 
not die", has been debated for over two centuries.
2
 Delegates to the Philadelphia 
convention indicated their early approval for the principle of tenure limitation by voting 
in favour of a single, seven-year term for the new national executive in May 1787. 
Subsequently, however, they endorsed the proposal for perpetually-renewable four year 
terms which emerged from the Committee on Unfinished Business later in the 
convention. In 1826, Representative Joseph Hemphill of Pennsylvania became the first of 
many members of Congress to reinstate the idea via a constitutional amendment.
3
 The 
constitution of the Confederate states adopted the formula for its presidency in 1861 and 
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call to remove the president's re-election prerogative were supported by numerous U.S. 
presidents, including Jackson, Polk, Cleveland and Harrison in the nineteenth century, 
and Taft, Johnson and Carter in the twentieth.
4
 After the principle of constitutionally-
limited tenure was adopted in 1951 through the Twenty-Second amendment, which 
restricted the president to two elected terms in office, the frequency with which single, 
six year term proposals appeared in Congress declined. During the 1980s, the Committee 
For A Single Six Year Presidential Term, whose founding members included former 
Attorneys General for the Eisenhower and Carter administrations, Herbert Brownell and 
Griffin Bell as well as former Nixon Treasury Secretary William Simon and Carter's first 
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance continued to press for reform.
5
 Although the committee 
made little headway in persuading Congress to take up a constitutional amendment, the 
concept of term limitation continued to provoke discussion among politicians, historians, 
political scientists and reporters, fuelled, in part, by the Republicans' 1994 midterm 
election pledge to introduce term limits for Congress members.   
The appeal of the six-year term rests partly in its simplicity - the deployment of 
one structural reform to counter a range of perceived faults in the contemporary political 
system - and partly in its advocates' capacity to adapt their arguments to differing 
political environments. Tenure reform is recommended as a remedy for the unchecked 
expansion of executive power, against presidents who push resentfully at the boundaries 
of their constitutional authority (the Johnson, Nixon and George W.Bush 
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administrations). Yet, it is also prescribed for 'weaker' presidencies beset by external 
pressures or internal contradictions (the Carter, Bush Sr. and, arguably, Obama 
administrations). This latter condition is, in fact, the main concern of reformers. In this, 
their campaign differs, both in nature and design, from the effort which produced the 
Twenty Second amendment in 1951. Where the prima facie purpose of that amendment 
was to check presidential expansion and demagoguery, six year term advocates highlight 
the dangers of a politically and institutionally weakened presidency. Their arguments, 
therefore, tend to focus mainly upon the perceived discrepancies between the ideal and 
the actual - between uplifting visions of the executive's potential and its too-often 
disappointing realities. 
The narrative underpinning the reform case depicts a gradual erosion of executive 
power, occurring during the second half of the twentieth century, which restricted the 
president's ability to define, or exercise a controlling influence over, the political agenda. 
This process, the result, reformers claim, of a combination of changes in the wider 
political environment and certain systemic reforms, generated deadlock and instability in 
the American political process and weakened the presidency as a source of national 
political leadership and moral inspiration. 
Franklin Roosevelt’s twelve-year administration signalled a historic shift in the 
power balance between the presidency and Congress. The crises of depression and world 
war called for rapid, centralised and coordinated decision-making which Congress was 
ill-equipped to provide. Increasingly, Americans looked to the presidency as the 
"legitimating center of the national political order, the primary repository of national 
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hopes and ambitions".
6
 Under FDR, the ‘stewardship’ model of presidential leadership (a 
prototype for which had been trailed by the active-interventionists Theodore Roosevelt 
and Woodrow Wilson) permanently displaced the older 'whig' concept of presidential 
power to become the standard by which all future presidents would operate.
7
  As 
Skowronek records, however, “expectations had been heightened, but since the basic 
constitutional structure had not changed, modern American government appeared to have 
placed incumbents in difficult straits.”8 Despite the presidency’s theoretical dominance 
during its post-1933  'imperial' phase, successive administrations struggled to manage 
their expanded domestic and international responsibilities and the needs of the federal 
government’s greatly-enlarged client base. Other systemic factors - the volatile legislative 
environment which followed the collapse of the seniority system in Congress; a dramatic 
rise in the size and influence of lobbying operations on Capitol Hill; a decline in party-
line voting and rising bureaucratic resistance to executive-led reform - further 
complicated the president’s task of summoning order from chaos. Administrations were 
increasingly forced to engage in micro-bartering for their victories, altering legislation to 
in response to interest group demands and constructing makeshift coalitions in Congress 
on an issue-by-issue basis. Consequently, legislation was often flawed or unworkable.  
The growth of television and the tendency of the news media to accentuate the 
public focus upon the presidency as the dynamic centre of national political power 
aggravated these problems - enhancing expectations of presidential performance and 
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deepening disappointment at its failure. Late-century presidents governed, as William 
Leuchtenburg notes, "in the shadow of FDR" but were hard-pressed to match either the 
dynamism of his first hundred days or the long-term impact of his policies.
9
 By the 
1970s, reformers contend, presidents' ability to define and pursue broad visions for the 
nation had been so obstructed that the fashionable liberal concept of 'presidential 
government' was, to all intents and purposes, illusory. "Far from being in charge", Hugh 
Heclo observed at the end of the decade, "…the president must struggle even to 
comprehend what is going on."
10
   
Vietnam and Watergate generated an anti-executive backlash in the media and on 
Capitol Hill. New restrictions, some more effective than others, were placed upon 
presidential autonomy in foreign and domestic policy while confrontational media 
coverage eroded much of the deference previously shown to the office of the presidency. 
This latter development, reformers suggest, impeded attempts by Ford and Carter to 
utilise the unique capacity of the presidency for defining broad national goals and 
articulating policy choices. By the end of the Carter administration, a consensus appeared 
to be growing that fundamental reform would be necessary to salvage presidential 
authority. Shortly before Ronald Reagan's first inauguration, Newsweek published a 
lengthy article assessing the crisis facing the modern executive. The office, it noted, had 
"in some measure defeated the last five men who have held it" and was now "becoming a 
game nobody can win".
11
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Neither Reagan's success in redefining the nation's political agenda nor the 
successful reelections of Bill Clinton and George W.Bush have muted the reform 
critique. Rather, its advocates claim, each administration highlighted, in different ways, 
the weaknesses of the modern institution - from Clinton's reliance on focus groups and 
sacrifice of ideological principles for electoral ends to the questionable legality of Bush's 
heightened national security powers and the use of divisive 'wedge tactics' to secure 
reelection.Before Reagan, no president since Eisenhower had completed eight years in 
office. By 2009, three presidents had served two full terms in office but the presidency, in 
the view of reformers, remained a 'broken' institution. 
  
The Case for Reform 
The single six-year term proposal combines two changes to presidential tenure in 
one measure. The first - ending the president's right to seek reelection - is intended to 
enhance both his measurable impact upon the policy process and the less tangible, but 
equally important, 'moral authority' to which all presidents aspire but which relatively 
few, in recent years, have achieved.  Reformers believe that cynicism arising from 
suspicions that the president's actions and speeches are motivated by electoral self-
interest would be reduced, thus strengthening the executive's hand in negotiations with 
Congress and improving its image in the media. Public faith in the institution of the 
presidency would rise as presidents were associated more with altruistic, principled 
leadership based upon the broader national interest.  
The second element of the reform - the lengthening of the president's term from 
four to six years - seeks to foster stability and coherence in the political process by 
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permitting the executive more time to introduce, oversee and adjust key policy initiatives 
while also reducing the scope for bureaucratic resistance to reforms. 
A closer examination of these goals allows us to understand the ways in which 
reformers seek to address current systemic probems, through the reshaping of political 
perception and behaviour. It also highlights the contentious interpretation of presidential 
power which lies at the heart of the reform case. 
 
The Electoral Cycle 
The removal of incumbent presidents from the electoral cycle appears, at first 
glance, to be simply an extension of the constitutional status quo existing since the 
passage of the Twenty-second amendment. The two reforms differ fundamentally, 
however, in their primary aim. The amendment was passed by the Republican Eightieth 
Congress in 1947, after the death of FDR. Although Dwight Eisenhower considered it "in 
large degree an act of retroactive vindictiveness against…Roosevelt rather than the result 
of judicious thinking about the institutions of the Republic", the amendment's sponsors 
maintained that the option of perpetual reelection encouraged the cultivation of 
personality cults.
12
  Further, the accumulated bureaucratic and judicial appointments of 
multi-term presidents threatened to extend their partisan influence for years beyond the 
lives of their own administrations, restricting their successors' ability to chart their own 
course. A heavy dose of 'institutional opportunism' certainly motivated the amendment. 
The Eightieth Congress was the first GOP-controlled Congress since 1931 and was 
hostile to the New Deal liberalism, which, under the Democrats, Roosevelt and Truman, 
had harnessed the presidency as a powerful motive force for liberal economic 
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programmes and social reforms. Also at work, however, was a more deeply-rooted 
mistrust of executive power which had influenced American political development since 
the late eighteenth century.
13
 Bowing to arguments that the right of voters to reward or 
reject presidents at the ballot box remained sacrosanct, reformers stopped short of 
eliminating reelection altogether. Heavy stress was laid, however, on the importance of 
respecting the precedent set by George Washington of retirement after two terms and 
Thomas Jefferson's expressed hope that "should a president consent to be a candidate for 
a third election, I trust he would be rejected on this demonstration of ambitious views."
14
   
The single term proposal differs from the Twenty-second amendment in its 
intention to liberate and augment, rather than restrict, presidential power. By closing off 
the reelection option, reformers hope to "take the politics out of the presidency…to 
elevate the presidency above selfish or factional ambitions." only in order to facilitate 
firm, disinterested and visionary leadership.
15
 Time and again, it is claimed, important 
initiatives at home and diplomacy abroad are 'warped' by the reelection imperative, with 
necessary sacrifices and bold initiatives shelved to placate influential voter groups. 
William Quandt, though unconvinced by many of the reformers' arguments, concedes 
that one consequence of the two-term system has been, " a foreign policy excessively 
geared to short-term calculations, in which narrow domestic political considerations often 
outweigh sound strategic thinking."
16
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Illustrating this point, Jimmy Carter, who supported tenure reform during and 
after his occupancy of the White House, maintained that his efforts to secure the release 
of American hostages from Teheran in 1979-81 were hampered by the necessity to fight 
off Senator Edward Kennedy's challenge to his renomination in spring 1980 and by the 
general election campaign against Ronald Reagan. Resentment of the 'intrusion' of 
electoral calculations in foreign policy seems to have been widespread in the top echelons 
of Carter's administration. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance concurred that, in Vance's words, "bad decisions are 
made under the pressures of months of primary elections… at home and overseas, we are 
frequently seen as inconsistent and unstable."
17
 
The full impact of the distorting influence of reelection campaigns was detectable, 
reformers contend, in American policy towards Vietnam in the last weeks of the Kennedy 
administration. Former JFK staffer Kenneth O'Donnell and Democratic Senate Majority 
Leader Mike Mansfield maintained the president had resolved, by the fall of 1963, to 
withdraw U.S. military personnel from South Vietnam but could not contemplate an 
announcement before the 1964 elections for fear of inviting accusations of 'weakness' 
from Republican opponents.
18
 Presidential activity, rather than inactivity, has also been 
criticised for its electoral implications. The air strikes ordered by President Bill Clinton 
on Iraq in September 1996, were attacked in some quarters as "gratuitous military action 
for political reasons" reaffirming reformers' belief that crucial strategic decisions in 
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foreign policy are too often shaped by the president's concern with his election 
prospects.
19
 
Identical problems, it is argued, obstruct policy formulation at home. Necessary 
decisions are often deferred by administrations because of their electoral implications. 
Treasury Secretary William Simon recalled a preparatory session for the 1976 State of 
the Union address, at which bold tax and welfare proposals were considered. President 
Ford initially approved the proposals,"Boy, I agree with this one hundred percent. We're 
going to do it." Immediately, Simon noted, "the political advisors' heads snapped around, 
and he added, "Next year." Of course, 'next year' never came for us."
20
 Equally 
significant, during the Ford period, was the president's announcement of his intention to 
pardon Richard Nixon, within weeks of succeeding the disgraced former president in 
August 1974, and his subsequent decision to pardon Nixon. Ford's reelection 
announcement was made on the advice of Dick Cheney, who argued that an early 
announcement would prevent Ford being viewed as a 'caretaker' leader. The Nixon 
pardon, in this context, appeared to some as a deliberate effort to clear the way for Ford's 
reelection bid by preventing the former president's trial from dominating newspaper 
headlines in 1975-6.
21
 
The manipulation of legislative agendas to suit reelection timetables is also held 
to obstruct innovative policy-making by encouraging a rushed, ad hoc approach to 
governance. Under a single six year term, it is claimed, the 'Task Force' established by 
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Bill and Hillary Clinton in 1993 to examine options for a radical overhaul of the 
healthcare system would have had more time to explore viable legislative strategies, 
consult cabinet officials and cultivate public opinion. Instead, to save time and debate, it 
deliberated in camera, cut corners by failing to coordinate cost estimates with Treasury 
forecasts and spent relatively little time canvassing grassroots public opinion. Officials 
later attributed this strategy to the need to push a cohesive package through Congress as 
fast as possible before the midterm elections. For the sake of speed, the chance for major 
reform of healthcare provision during a period of (theoretically) unified government was 
lost.  
President Clinton's capitulation to congressional Republicans on welfare reform in 
1995 and the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 are presented as further evidence of the 
negative consequences of reelection pressures. In both cases, reformers were less 
disturbed by the president's abandonment of core liberal principles, since the notion that 
presidents should be able to "do what is right even if this meant that their party would 
lose votes…or their own political future would be damaged" is, in fact, central to reform 
arguments.
22
  Rather, the issue was Clinton's motivation for the abandonment and the 
subsequent cost to public trust in the presidency. Two senior liberal advisers to the 
president resigned in protest at White House backing for the welfare bill while Clinton's 
approval of DOMA undermined years of work by Democrats cultivating the trust of gay 
voters. In both cases, reformers claim, public faith in principled presidential leadership 
suffered for Clinton's knee-jerk responses to election pressures. 
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These pressures have accumulated over time and now threaten to divert the 
attention not only of presidents but also of other political actors and the news media from 
important policy issues. Nomination rules reforms in the 1970s, for example, increased 
the number of presidential primary contests held by Republicans and Democrats, forcing 
candidates to start exploratory committees and fund-raising initiatives years, rather than 
months, in advance of the convention. This backward momentum often distracts the 
media from its responsibility to inform the electorate of key political developments and 
debates. As Burke notes, "the situation is increasingly debilitating for a sitting president 
as attention now focusses on the upcoming presidency earlier and earlier each election 
cycle."
23
 As a consequence, reformers contend, innovative leadership from the White 
House and the implementation of key policy goals must be squeezed into an eighteen-
month 'window of opportunity' or risk being lost altogether. 
 
Term Extension and 'Moral Authority' 
In calling for a presidency "more scrupulous and less prone to self-interested 
political motives", Jimmy Carter emphasises the potential of tenure reform as a solution 
to the dilemmas confronting Clinton and other presidents seeking reelection.
24
 Increased 
public respect for the office, he contends, would confer on the president "greater moral 
authority and credibility, and perhaps greater influence on…policy formulation"25 
Presidents would, by implication, feel more confident in promoting their core beliefs and 
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defending administration priorities against pressures from Congress or special interests. 
Reformers stress Franklin Roosevelt’s maxim that the presidency is “pre-eminently a 
place of moral leadership” and it is this belief, not simply the aim to save the president 
time and angst in policy-making, which constitutes the radical core of the case for a 
single, six-year term.
26
 Reformers do not seek merely to tinker at the margins of 
executive influence but to effect a fundamental change in presidential behaviour and in 
responses to, and perceptions of, executive power by other political actors. 
It is, perhaps, unsurprising that Carter's arguments dwell particularly on notions of 
credibility and moral authority. His 1976 election campaign, conducted in the aftermath 
of Watergate, criticised the corruption and patronage endemic in Washington and 
attacked the 'old politics' of power-bargaining with party bosses and special interests. In 
office, he rejected the combative partisanship and free use of patronage characteristic of 
his two Democratic predecessors, Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson. Instead, Carter 
sought to emphasise the national and moral, rather than sectional or partisan, aspects of 
executive leadership. As Rep.Barber Conable (R-NY) put it, less than sympathetically, 
the president often "just decided what was right and announced it".
27
  Some senior Carter 
administration officials, including Griffin Bell, later attributed much of the blame for the 
ultimate failure of this approach to the reluctance of Congress and the media to separate 
Carter's actions as president from his electoral interests as titular head of the Democratic 
party. Carter himself complained that journalists and Congress members were too 
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inclined to "dispute or contradict the president on the issues for strictly political 
reasons."
28
  
Ineligibility for reelection, from this perspective, improves the president's ability 
to frame policy debates in broader national and moral terms, making more egregious acts 
of political self-interest, such as Clinton’s approval of DOMA, unnecessary. 'Trust' and 
'moral authority' are regarded by reformers as equal in importance to the popular vote as a 
power resource for the presidency. As Schack notes, "A President who is not trusted 
cannot be effective. If reelection pressures subvert credibility and foster skepticism, the 
presidency is continually undermined, thereby precluding effective government."
29
  
A second important benefit claimed by supporters of tenure reform is the 
extension of the minimum term for presidents from four to six years. As Godfrey 
Hodgson observes, "It is always election year in Washington."
30
 Under current 
arrangements, the constraints of  presidential and congressional election cycles cut deep 
into the time available to pass legislation. By the spring of an administration's second 
year, members are increasingly distracted by  primary challenges in their home district. 
They are less receptive to presidential initiatives unless these carry some tangible 
electoral benefit and may be overtly hostile to them if they carry significant risk. Even if 
the campaign does not produce an opposition-controlled Congress (an outcome which 
had serious implications for Clinton after 1994 and Bush after 2006) the president's own 
political capital is still likely to have fallen sufficiently by the third year of the 
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administration to embolden his opponents in Congress to delay or defeat administration 
bills in order to diminish the president's reelection prospects. 
As Lyndon Johnson told a staffer in 1965, "You've got to give it all you can, that 
first year…You've got just one year when they treat you right and before they start 
worrying about themselves."
31
  Yet, the first year of a new administration is often fraught 
with problems and most require a 'settling in' period as presidents and their cabinet 
secretaries, particularly those with little or no experience of Washington, learn 'on the job' 
-  locating the levers of power, testing media management strategies, developing 
congressional liaison operations and staffing their departments. During this phase, 
mistakes are often made, from which, under a four-year term, there is little time to 
recover. The early months of both the Carter and Clinton administrations were marred by 
the early bungling of congressional relations and tactical errors in dealing with legislative 
priorities such as energy and healthcare. 
Compounding these problems is the inevitable bureaucratic 'drag' on the 
president's policy agenda - a resistance to change which hardens as a four year term 
progresses. Since federal government agencies are generally more "loose confederations 
of semi-autonomous bureaux", than monolithic, centrally-coordinated structures, it is 
difficult for the president, within a four-year time span, to control their activities.
32
 By the 
middle of the third year, the rate of policy implementation tends to slow, pending the 
outcome of the next election. During this time, presidents focus on achievable, short-term 
gains rather than radical reforms, regardless of their importance to the nation. 
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In summary, the six-year term is presented by its advocates as an empowering and 
facilitating device, not a restricting one, with  the potential to raise the president above 
partisanship,  providing him with both the time and the tools to govern in the national 
interest. This re-empowerment of the presidency, resulting from its enhanced 'moral 
authority' and longer time-frame, would, it is claimed, make a substantial difference to 
the dynamics of national politics and the quality and dignity of executive leadership. 
The Case Against Reform 
The proposal for a single, six-year term traditionally draws strong opposition from 
a majority of politicians as well as political scientists, historians and journalists, who 
contend that institutional or behavioural 'dysfunction' cannot be corrected by a single, 
structural adjustment. The radicalism of the reform, moreover, is criticised as excessive - 
"tantamount to an argument," Buchanan suggests, "that the only solution to a broken arm 
is amputation" - and more likely to diminish, not increase, the stature of the presidency.
 33
 
The idea, critics contend, fails to account for the complexity of political and institutional 
relationships, misconstrues the role of the presidency in those relationships and is, at 
base, a fundamentally anti-democratic measure. 
 
The Electoral Cycle 
Critics broadly accept that reelection pressures can negatively impact upon foreign and 
domestic policy-making, but argue that the prospect of a second encounter with the 
electorate - and the reward or punishment of the administration for its successes or 
failures - also exerts a positive influence over executive behaviour. Presidents are 
compelled to re-examine their priorities, recalibrating policies in response to shifting 
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trends in public opinion or to regain the trust of alienated voter groups. Examples of 
positive recalibration, it is claimed, are as numerous as the negative examples identified 
by reformers. Fischer suggests, for example, that the 1984 reelection campaign induced 
an unexpectedly conciliatory tone in the foreign policy statements of the Reagan 
administration, beginning with the president's 16 January radio broadcast which called 
for "greater cooperation and understanding" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
34
 
This departure from the aggressive Cold War rhetoric of the first three years of the 
Reagan presidency, Fischer suggests, was partly influenced by the need to "appeal to 
moderate voters who had been disturbed by the president's hardline rhetoric."
35
  The 
motivation behind other 'positive' foreign policy actions, such as Nixon's visit to China or 
the Clinton peace mission in Northern Ireland, could also be attributed to both presidents' 
desire to bolster their foreign policy records for electoral gain. More importantly, critics 
note, definitions of 'positive' or 'negative' outcomes are, in any event, a matter of partisan 
or ideological perspective. The early withdrawal of troops from Vietnam by President 
Kennedy, for example, would have represented a 'negative', not a 'positive', policy 
outcome to Republican conservatives and to supporters of traditional containment theory 
across both major parties. Similarly, Reagan's softened rhetoric, which paved the way for 
arms reduction treaties with the Soviet Union in the later 1980s, attracted praise from 
moderates and liberals but was deplored by neoconservatives such as Irving Kristol, as a 
misguided strategy which threw away valuable military and strategic advantages over the 
communist bloc. On a related point, as David Karol points out, some of the most 
controversial executive decisions on foreign policy, including the1961 Bay of Pigs 
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invasion, the 'secret bombing' of Cambodia in 1969 and the 1989 invasion of Panama, 
occurred during the first year of the presidential terms of Presidents Kennedy, Nixon and 
Bush Sr.
36
 None of these actions could realistically be ascribed to 're-election pressures' 
but none would have been prevented under a single, six-year term.  
While opponents of reform do not necessarily disagree with Quandt's contention 
that "foreign policy issues are likely to be assessed at the White House in terms of 
whether or not they can help advance the incumbent's re-election bid", they regard the 
problem as exaggerated. Re-election inevitably affects strategic planning to an extent, but 
is not necessarily the decisive factor in every case.
37
 Instead, as Buchanan argues, the 
influence of the re-election campaign is "sometimes bad, sometimes good and sometimes 
irrelevant"
38
  
Another flaw in the reform case is its tendency to overlook the potential impact of 
re-election, which projects not only backward into the first term but also forward into the 
second. Clinton's re-election in November 1996, for example, was instrumental in 
providing the president with fresh leverage against members of Congress who opposed 
compromise with the White House on the issue of deficit reduction. House Republicans 
had attempted to wrest the initiative on fiscal policy from the president after the GOP 
victory in the 1994 midterms, resulting in a stalemate and partial government 'shutdown' 
in 1995. Clinton's re-election and opinion polls indicating that a majority blamed 
Republicans for the impasse, persuaded senior Republicans to accept a negotiated 
compromise which produced the first budget surplus for nearly three decades in 1999. 
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Re-election, therefore, has the capacity to re-energise administrations, providing fresh 
political capital and impetus for their legislative agenda and sometimes stimulating a 
'realism' in Congress which enhances political stability.  
Reformers are inclined to dispute this point, arguing that the record of presidential 
failure or corruption during second terms (from the weakened political clout of 
Eisenhower and George W. Bush to the Watergate, Iran-Contra and Monica Lewinsky 
scandals) undermines the case for re-election. Critics point out, however, that the seeds of 
all three second-term scandals were planted during the first years of the Nixon, Reagan 
and Clinton administrations, a problem unlikely to be avoided by introducing a single, 
six-year term. Further, opponents of reform lay most of the blame for the 'lame duck' 
status of second-term presidents squarely upon the negative impact of the Twenty-Second 
amendment and suggest repeal of the amendment would go some way to removing the 
need for passage of a second, more draconian, term limitation measure. 
 
President and Party 
A non-renewable term, critics argue, would also be likely to increase the political 
isolation of the president as a consequence of the de facto electoral divorce of the 
executive branch from the party organisation. The prospect of re-election serves as a 
constant reminder to presidents of the realities of institutional and political 
interdependence. Notably, two prominent supporters of the single six-year term - Richard 
Nixon and Jimmy Carter - were among those presidents least inclined to welcome such 
reminders. Both frequently resisted pressures to engage in party-building activities and 
mediate intra-party disputes. Re-election staff at the Committee to Re-elect the President 
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(CREEP) maintained a contemptuous distance from the Republican National Committee 
and congressional campaign committees throughout 1972, in accordance with Nixon 
White House directives. "The Nixon people," Stephen Ambrose records, "grabbed all the 
political contributions for CREEP, leaving little or nothing for congressional or state 
candidates."
39
 Similarly, Carter "did not encourage new Democratic talent or ideas" and 
"neglected both the mechanism and the vision of the party."
40
  The apathy generated 
among Democratic activists by White House disinterest in party priorities was a key 
factor driving Edward Kennedy's challenge to the president’s renomination in 1980. It 
also ensured that, after Reagan's landslide victory in November, the party would wash its 
hands of the president. "As far as the party is concerned," TIME observed after the 
election, "Carter will disappear like dew on a hot day."
41
 
Despite the impact of reforms to candidate selection rules, growth of interest 
groups and the executive's use of modern media tools to connect directly with voters, 
party organisations remain powerful bulwarks, helping administrations to weather voter 
hostility, media antagonism and congressional investigations. Partisan loyalty was 
essential in shoring up Democratic congressional support for Bill Clinton during the 
1998-9 impeachment hearings and helped protect Ronald Reagan's support base at his 
administration's low point during the 1986-7 Iran-Contra scandal. This was partly due to 
the efforts made by both presidents to maintain the semblance of a working relationship 
between the White House and the national party. Although strategic synchronisation was 
often erratic in the Reagan and Clinton eras, both presidents remained committed to 
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traditional partisanship as the lynchpin of democratic politics. Perhaps coincidentally, 
both men served two full terms and both publicly opposed adoption of the single, six-year 
term.
42
  
Carter, conversely, treated the national Democratic party as "an albatross around 
my neck".
43
 For its critics, tenure reform threatens multiple repetitions of the Carter 
experience. National and state party organisations would feel less obliged to remain loyal 
to presidents who declared their 'independence' from party interests after their election to 
a single term. This reconfiguration of the party-executive relationship would also 
embolden party leaders in Congress to take greater control of policy-making and deprive 
the White House of its traditional influence over the party's machinery, patronage and 
nominating conventions.
44
 The significance of this weakened influence was not lost on 
Richard Nixon, who switched sides in the single, six-year term debate some years after 
leaving office. Justifying his reversal, Nixon argued that a single term would only 
accelerate the weakening of respect for the president's authority since other political 
actors "will know that the day will soon come when he can no longer do something to 
them or for them."
45
  
The president-party relationship would, therefore, be radically weakened by 
tenure reform, compelling presidents to rely more heavily on plebiscitary leadership via 
the mobilisation of public and media support. This argument, of course, runs directly 
counter to reformers' claims that ending presidential re-elections would decrease the 
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destabilising influence of constantly-changing trends in popular and partisan opinion. 
Tenure reform, critics suggest, would be "freeing the president from party but not from 
popularity"
 
, a development which could not guarantee enhanced public respect or 
political effectiveness for the presidency 
46
. As Edwards points out, President Clinton 
discovered, to his cost, the limits of the president's ability to "use public support as 
leverage to overcome known political obstacles" during the 1993-4 healthcare reform 
debates.
47
 
Abolishing presidential re-election, of course, would not remove the influence of 
partisan campaigning on Washington politics. Despite the security of tenure enjoyed by a 
six-year president, the congressional re-election cycle would continue unaltered, with all 
House members and one-third of the Senate facing re-election every two years. This new 
disjunction could only increase the political and psychological distance between 
Congress and the White House. Senators and Representatives would continue to renew or 
lose their mandates at regular intervals, permitting Congress to claim closer adherence to 
changing trends in public opinion. The president's mandate, however, would age 
irreversibly from the moment of his inauguration - a process that could only work to his 
disadvantage as his term progressed. Midterm elections are generally seen as referenda 
on incumbent administrations but also have an energising impact upon Congress. Where 
some midterms (1998, 2002) may inflict minimal damage on the president's party, and 
may even strengthen it, others (1994, 2006, 2010) can substantially undermine 
presidential support in one or both chambers, encouraging opportunistic resistance to 
administration policies in the new Congress. Under the system of renewable four-year 
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terms, the possibility of the president's re-election will afford at least a modicum of 
protection against the problem of the 'ageing mandate'. Without the ability to match the 
legislature's mandate-renewal cycle, however, the president would quickly appear out of 
touch with public opinion, lose essential bargaining power and seem less ‘relevant’ in 
policy debates than the parties and interest groups who had consulted repeatedly with the 
electorate. The 'lame duck' status already afflicting post-1951 second-term presidents 
could, therefore, begin even earlier in a six-year, non-renewable term.  
Reformers' faith in structural manipulation, therefore, seems badly misplaced. 
Congress, still working to its own electoral calendar, would be less inclined to comply 
with White House requests or directives which conflicted with its own, more partisan, 
goals and could hardly resist asserting the superiority of its 'updated' mandate. Enhanced 
‘moral authority’ would not compensate the White House for this new disadvantage. As 
Hargrove and Nelson note, "New rules will not cause legislators to follow presidents."
48
 
Instead, the unreformed congressional election cycle would present presidents with an 
uncomfortable dilemma - either to remain above the fray during midterm campaigns or to 
campaign for their allies in Congress. The first option would simply reinforce a general 
perception of the presidency's isolation from current political debate. The second would 
require it to engage in precisely the kind of partisan activity which, reformers argue, 
eroded executive credibility in the first place.  
In summary, to opponents of reform, the single, six-year term is a bad 'fit' for 
America's political system as currently constituted. Without further, substantial 
constitutional changes to address the string of unintended consequences which, critics 
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believe, would follow tenure reform, the office of the presidency would lose much of its 
political clout, becoming still more dependent for its continued influence on focus groups 
and media support. 
 
Politics and the Presidency 
Underlying the debate over the impact of re-election campaigns on policy and 
institutional relationships, critics identify a more fundamental difference of opinion over 
the nature of politics itself - labelled by Buchanan the "politics is good" versus "politics is 
bad" argument.
49
 Reform advocates aim to increase the president's 'moral authority'  
through careful cultivation of a dignified, non-partisan image which elicits respect and 
trust from the public. They exhibit a distaste for the obligations of routine partisan 
politics, at least to the extent that these involve the executive. During the Carter 
administration, Press Secretary Jody Powell admitted the president "enjoys building a 
consensus with the public more than with the legislature".
50
 White House relations with 
Congress in the Carter years were notable for the "inadequate use of the carrot-stick 
trade-off", the combination of arm-twisting and inducement which the president 
considered demeaning to executive dignity.
51
 Carter's reelection campaign 'Rose Garden 
strategy' was instead designed, probably unwisely, to transmit the message that the 
president was too busy governing the nation to indulge in the ‘distraction’ of appealing to 
the electorate. This negative view of the participation of sitting presidents in election 
campaigns reaches back to the early days of campaigns for the single, six-year term. In 
                                                 
49
 Bruce Buchanan, "The Six-Year, One-Term Presidency", 135. 
50
 Clifton McCleskey, Pierce McCleskey, "Carter and the Democratic Party" in Abernathy et al. The Carter 
Years. 133. 
51
 Q.Whitfield Ayres, "The Carter White House Staff" in Abernathy et al. The Carter Years. 155. 
 27 
1913, California Senator John D. Works, an early reform supporter, denounced the 
spectacle of a president running for re-election as "degrading to the President 
himself...(it) brings his great office into disrespect."
52
   
For opponents of reform, however, Schack suggests, politics is ‘good’53 The 
fundamental premise underpinning modern liberal democracies is assumed to be the duty 
of elected officials, from the president downwards, to maintain close contact with the 
electorate, from whom power and legitimation are drawn. To ensure executive leadership 
remains responsive, presidents must continually interact with public opinion on many 
levels - through elections, focus groups, websites, press conferences and opinion polls as 
well as through other institutions and agencies such as Congress, political parties and 
interest groups. Schlesinger, observing the importance of re-election, notes, "Few things 
have a more salubrious effect on a president's…sensitivity to public concerns than the 
desire for re-election."
54
 The efforts presidents must make to engage with the modern 
electorate are arduous and time-consuming but escape from this interaction is deemed 
neither practical nor desirable. They must persist or forfeit  altogether their claim to 
represent the active electorate or the broadly defined 'national interest'. Placing the 
presidency above politics, Schlesinger concludes, is "plainly hostile to the genius of 
democracy."
55
 
Opponents of reform often base this part of their case upon Alexander Hamilton's 
claim, in Federalist 72, that “desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human 
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conduct".
56
  For Hamilton, the very concept of term limitation is potentially harmful to 
the practice of democracy. The obligation to submit to regular interim judgement by the 
electorate encourages presidents to conduct themselves in ways which attract sufficiently 
broad public approval to secure re-election. Buchanan concurs this "power of anticipated 
approval" should never be regarded as a distraction, still less a burdensome by-product of 
modern mass politics, but as a crucial means by which "democratic control is most 
tangibly, consistently and meaningfully exercised."
57
 
The prospect of re-election acts as an efficient method for constraining leaders who may 
be tempted to behave irresponsibly or corruptly in their conduct of the nation's affairs. 
Here, Hamilton notes, the founders' agreement upon a constitutional arrangement of 
renewable four-year terms for presidents was necessary in order "to make their interests 
coincide with their duty".
58
  If presidents no longer feared repudiation at the polls, those 
"inducements to good behavior" which, he freely admits, spring from the selfish hope of 
political reward, would be eliminated. Once released from such worries, presidents 
"might not scruple to have recourse to the most corrupt expedients to make the harvest as 
abundant as it was transitory."
59
  
Contemporary writers reiterate Hamilton's fears of the corruptive potential of term 
limitation but go further, expressing concern at the possible consequences of increased 
isolation of the Oval Office from the stimuli of interaction with the electorate. Negative 
psychological traits, such as petulance, paranoia, arrogance and stubbornness, would be 
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magnified by further distancing the president from the electorate. Term limitation has 
already clearly demonstrated its inability to mitigate this problem. As Schlesinger points 
out, Congress, in passing the Twenty-second amendment, ignored the warnings of 
Hamilton by institutionalising the 'lame duck' second term. The amendment did nothing, 
however, to prevent the three major late-century political scandals which followed. 
Equally disturbing to critics is the implication that American government requires 
the services of a 'philosopher-king' in the Oval Office. Conflicting perceptions over the 
ideal character of the presidency, like those concerning the nature of democratic politics 
outlined above, lie at the heart of the debate over reform. Reformers and their opponents 
adhere to starkly differing interpretations of the ideal role for the chief executive within 
the American political system, a difference hinted at in Weeks' 1913 attack on 
presidential electioneering and more fully expounded by Jimmy Carter. Underpinning the 
entire reform critique is an urge to return the presidency to a more 'dignified' phase of its 
history, before the rise of competitive party systems compelled presidents to rely upon 
partisanship, patronage and political bargaining to achieve their objectives. Under early 
presidents, particularly Madison and Monroe, aloofness from political street-fighting was 
considered an essential virtue - enabling presidents to retain public confidence by 
avoiding the appearance of partisan bias or preference in sectional rivalries. The 'popular 
presidency', as defined by Ralph Ketcham and exemplified, in more recent years, by 
Dwight Eisenhower, cultivates and stores public approval by avoiding divisive issues, 
facilitating compromise between rival groups and rhetorically downplaying the 
importance of narrow ideological perspectives or party agendas in favour of appeals to 
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altruism and national unity.
60
 Rather than behaving as the victor in a contest between 
bitter rivals, the 'popular' president "gains office…by seeming not to have a partisan 
program at all".
61
  
Diametrically opposed to this model, the 'partisan presidency', exemplified by 
Andrew Jackson and later presidents such as Wilson, FDR, Reagan and George W.Bush, 
embraces and pursues party interests, often treating partisan goals and the national 
interest as synonymous. The strength of this approach, and its success in eclipsing the 
'popular' model, derives from its willingness to spend, rather than simply accumulate, the 
authority and credibility gained through popular support. This willingness constitutes a 
recognition that, as the American political environment changed rapidly through the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, absorbing far higher levels of mass participation, the 
presidency was forced to abandon its aloof stance and accept competitive coexistence 
with other political actors and institutions.  As suggested earlier, the expansion of federal 
authority elevated the status of the executive until much of the nation’s political dialogue 
appeared to be framed and directed entirely by the president. Nevertheless, critics point 
out, the political system is not, and was never intended to be, president-centred. To 
reorder institutional relationships for the convenience of the president's 'moral authority' 
not only overestimates the power of a single structural change but places undue emphasis 
on presidential performance as a measure of the health and fitness of the system as a 
whole. Without a wholesale redesign of the constitutional balance of powers, scaling 
back, particularly, the role of parties and interest groups, there can be no return to the 
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days of Monroe. "If we have learned anything in recent years," Cronin and Genovese 
note, "it is that the doctrine of presidential infallibility has been rejected."
62
   
The complex challenges facing all presidents must be confronted and overcome 
through the exercise of superior political skills. Some presidents have aspired to rise 
above the partisan fray but, Burns reminds us, “They have failed because the office is 
political in every sense of the word".
63
 By a combination of luck and judicious 
husbanding and deployment of political resources, some presidents will succeed in 
pushing legislation through Congress and maintaining healthy opinion poll ratings. 
Others will fail. It is difficult to conceive that a single, six-year term would have 
tempered the vicious mindset of the Nixon White House, changed Jimmy Carter's 
attitudes toward patronage and bartering or offset George H.W. Bush's flawed 
communication skills. The moral authority prized by Carter, critics contend, must be 
earned, spent and, if possible, renewed. It cannot be conferred by a constitutional 
amendment which, to many political scientists, remains nothing more than "an illusory 
quick fix" for a complex, deeply-rooted set of institutional and political problems.
64
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Conclusion 
There is something strangely 'un-American' about the proposal for a single, six-year 
presidential term. Indeed, the deployment of term limits at any level of the American 
political system often seems incongruous in a political culture which thrives on mano a 
mano combat and celebrates the power of the ballot in rewarding or punishing elected 
officials. The nature of the single, six-year term proposal itself reflects this contradiction. 
Term limitation reflects a thread of suspicion toward executive authority which runs 
through the American political psyche, yet reformers' seek to enhance, not to restrict, that 
authority. Support for this reform, unlike support for the Twenty-second amendment, 
derives from frustration that presidents appear more powerless than dictatorial. The only 
practical solution to this problem, it is suggested, is to re-invent the presidency as an 
essentially non-partisan force dedicated to conciliation and visionary leadership and less 
susceptible to the destabilising influences which complicate modern mass politics. As 
such, the reform is far more radical than it appears at first sight. As a solution to the 
problems afflicting contemporary American politics, however, it is badly flawed. Its 
interpretation of the nature and purpose of presidential leadership is idealistic but entirely 
out of step with modern public and media expectations of the office. The experiences of 
Jimmy Carter and, more recently, Barack Obama suggest that a sober, 'above the fray' 
stance has limited utility as a power resource. Public support, unfiltered and unorganised 
by political parties or special interests, remains an unstable commodity and a poor 
substitute for an ideologically-committed base. Moreover, severing the electoral 
connection between presidents and voters would inevitably increase the sense of 
psychological isolation which has plagued holders of the office since George 
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Washington. In some respects, reformers' preoccupation with 'detatchment', 'respect' and 
'moral authority' as the ideal foundations of executive influence reflect an urge to return 
the presidency to its paternalistic, early nineteenth century roots but the nature of modern 
mass democracy makes such a project not only impossible but also ill-advised. 
"Stripped of its romance," Newsweek observed in January 1981, "the history of 
the American Presidency is a record of long passages of muddling through and 
intermittent episodes of greatness."
65
 Advocates of tenure reform overlook this fact in 
their persistently negative view of conventional political activity and their in habitual 
tendency to identify 'good' government with the president's ability to get his own way. As 
Quandt notes, "frequent elections and the concept of popular sovereignty were all meant 
to limit abuses of power, not to make it easy for a president to govern."
66
  
Opponents of reform acknowledge that much is wrong with the modern American 
political system and with the theory and practice of executive power. A single, six-year 
presidential term - embodying antiquated concepts of leadership and bringing with it a 
string of unintended consequences - would do little to solve these problems and could 
only be a backward step for American democracy. 
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